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As most European countries were coming out of
recession at the end of 2009, Greece was entering a
tumultuous period. The announcement of the
newly elected Greek government in October 2009
that the projected budget deficit for 2009 would be
12.7 percent of GDP2 (rather than the 5.1 percent
projection that appeared in the 2009 Spring
Commission forecast), was initially met with shock
and opprobrium in Brussels and other euro-area
capitals. The initial reaction of policymakers
across the European Union was that the risk of
contagion was minimal, and that the right way to
deal with the situation was to let Greece “swing in
the wind”. 
However, by April 2010 the manifestations of the
Greek crisis were perceived as threatening the finan-
cial stability of the euro area. In early May 2010 the
contagion from the Greek crisis was indeed spread-
ing across Europe. Moreover, the Irish, Portuguese,
and Spanish repo bond markets were becoming less
liquid, and market participants started paying clos-
er attention to the exposure of different banks to
Greek, Portuguese or Spanish sovereign debt (BIS
2010). By this time policymakers had recognised the
gravity of the situation, and in addition to the
110 billion euros bailout package offered to Greece
by the European Union, the European Central
Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) – commonly known as the “troika” – they
decided on May 10 to set up a rescue package,
totalling up to 750 billion euros in an effort to pre-
vent a euro-area confidence crisis.3 The ECB pro-
vided further support through its decision to buy
euro-area bonds in the secondary markets.
This chapter discusses whether the bailout package
will prove sufficient to place the Greek economy on
a sustainable path, i.e. whether after the end of the
programme in June 2013 Greece will be able (or the
market will perceive it as able and willing) to con-
tinue making the large interest payments and roll
over its debt without the need for further official
assistance.
Any attempt at understanding how Greece reached
the brink of default, and whether the current
bailout package and attendant policy measures and
reforms will succeed in solving Greece’s perceived
solvency problems, requires that some salient (and
unique among the EU countries) features of the
Greek economy are brought to attention. We review
these features in Section 3.3, immediately after
describing the evolution of key macroeconomic
aggregates (Section 3.2). We then discuss in Section
3.4 the details of the bailout package and the poli-
cies and reforms (including pension reform) under-
taken so far. In Section 3.5 we evaluate whether the
policies detailed by the Memorandum of Under-
standing (the official agreement between the Greek
government and the European Union, IMF and
ECB) will be enough to return Greece’s public and
external debt to a sustainable path. This section dis-
cusses also whether it will prove politically feasible
to implement the policies detailed in the
Memorandum. Section 3.6 discusses how Greece
will deal with the day after the official financing
runs out in the second quarter of 2013. Section 3.7
offers some concluding comments.
3.2 Macroeconomic developments 
In this section we give a brief overview of the main
macroeconomic developments in Greece during the
last five decades, but the emphasis will be on the evo-
lution of the Greek economy during the last 15 years.
We also focus more on issues of economic structure
that differentiate the Greek economy from the rest of
the euro area. 
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1 This chapter has been prepared with the partial input of Thomas
Moutos. He also kindly allowed the EEAG to use material he has
published elsewhere and has assured the EEAG that the editors have
given their promission. See Katsimi and Moutos (2010) and Moutos
and Tsitsikas (2010).
2 The 2009 budget deficit turned out to be significantly higher than
that. After a revision by Eurostat in April 2010, which placed it at
13.6 percent of GDP, the latest figure (November 2010) announced
by Eurostat is 15.4 percent of GDP.
3 The total of 750 billion euros will consist of up to 500 billion euros
provided by euro-area member states, with the IMF providing at
least half as much.3.2.1 Growth performance 
Following the end of the three-year
civil war in 1949, Greece started its
reconstruction period in the 1950s.
According to Maddison (1995),
Greece had in 1950 the lowest per-
capita income among the group of
countries that later became the EU-15.
Consistent with convergence theories,
Greece was the fastest growing econo-
my among this group of countries
from 1950 to 1973 and by 1973 its per
capita GDP had risen above Ireland’s
and Portugal’s. During the rest of the
1970s Greece’s growth rate decelerat-
ed, but it was still the highest among
the (later to become the) EU-15, and the second
highest growth rate among the OECD countries
behind only Japan. This development is portrayed
in Figure 3.1. 
The long period of fast growth came to an abrupt end
in the 1980s. During this decade, per capita GDP in
Greece grew not only at a slower rate than the peri-
pheral-4 (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), but also
in comparison with the (unweighted) average for the
(later to become the) EU-15 and the OECD (2 percent
and 2.1 percent, respectively). 
The anaemic performance of the economy continued
until 1993 (the 1990 to 1993 growth in per capita
GDP was minus 0.5 percent per annum), but
improved for the rest of the 1990s and accelerated in
the first decade of the new millennium. However, as
discussed below, the relatively fast growth of the last
decade did not have solid foundations, but was based
on an unsustainable public and private
spending spree.
3.2.2 Labour market 
The changes in the average growth
rates from decade to decade were
reflected in changes in the unemploy-
ment rate (Figure 3.2). Until 1981, due
to fast output growth and emigration,
the unemployment rate was kept below
4 percent. By 1984, the unemployment
rate had climbed above 7 percent, and
it declined slightly up to the end of the
decade. During the 1990s the unem-
ployment rate increased gradually to 11.7 percent in
1999, despite the fact that the 1990s were a higher-
growth decade than the 1980s. The fast growth dur-
ing the last decade brought the unemployment rate
down to 7.7 percent in 2008, but by 2009 it had
climbed to 9.5 percent, reaching even 13.5 percent in
October 2010. 
The fluctuations in the unemployment rate were not
matched by fluctuations in the total employment rate
which, following a small decline in the early 1990s,
increased steadily, from 55 percent in 1983 to 61 per-
cent in 2008. Unlike other euro-area (EA) countries,
the increases in the employment rate in Greece were
not accompanied by substantial decreases in hours
worked per employed person (Figure 3.3). The aver-
age annual hours worked per employed person remain
far above the EA-12 average (Greece: 2,160, EA-12:
1,578, in 2009) and are higher than in any other coun-
try in the EU-27. 

































Source: Ameco: Domestic Product, Gross Domestic Product per Head of Population, at Constant Prices 
(RVGDP), ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm, data extracted on 11 January 2011; 
own calculations.
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An explanation for the high number of hours worked
is the importance of self-employment in the Greek
economy. The share of self-employment in total
employment is the highest among OECD countries (it
is about 16 percentage points higher than the EA-12
average).4 Self-employed people tend to work and
report longer hours than dependent employees; for
example, it is common for small store owners – and
there are many of them in Greece – to work more than
70 hours per week. 
A complementary explanation reflects the interaction
between the Greek socio-economic structure, an
underdeveloped welfare state and employment protec-
tion legislation (EPL). Greece had (until the reforms
of July 2010) one of the strictest EPL measures
among OECD countries (OECD 2004). A high level
of EPL implies that employers will try to sort out
among job applicants of similar productivity those
ones who are more likely to stay with the firm for a
long period of time, and offer them a wage-employ-
ment package that involves long work hours. Given
the Greek family and social welfare structure, these
applicants will most likely be prime-aged men. The
absence of a well-developed welfare state implies that
females face serious constraints in their labour market
activity. Both the willingness of employers to hire
them will be lower (as employers may wish to avoid
future quits induced by childbearing or other family-
related care activities that are usually performed by
women), and jobs clashing with
their responsibilities as home-
makers will be less attractive. The
efficient course of action for a
family in these circumstances is
often for the male member to
work long hours in market-based
activities and the female member
to specialize in home production
(or to participate in the shadow
economy). 
Given the expected contraction
in aggregate demand for hours
of work in the Greek economy
due to the consolidation mea-
sures of the bailout package, it
is important that policy mea-
sures are taken that soften the impact on the mea-
sured unemployment rate and the incidence of un-
employment by inducing some work-sharing (e.g.,
through facilitating the creation of part-time em-
ployment opportunities or temporary reductions in
individual work hours).
3.2.3 Public sector 
The Greek government is highly centralized. The
central government collected almost 67 percent of
revenues and accounted for about 55 percent of
expenditures in 2007; the relevant figures for the
OECD as a whole are 58 percent and 43 percent,
respectively (OECD 2009). Local governments repre-
sent a very small portion of total revenues and expen-
ditures (Greece: 2.6 percent and 5.6 percent, OECD:
17.6 percent and 32.2 percent, respectively) and
receive most of their revenues as grants from the cen-
tral government (more than 90 percent of their fund-
ing). Social security funds account for over 30 percent
of revenues and almost 40 percent of expenditures
(OECD: 21.4 percent and 24.6 percent, respectively). 
3.2.3.1 Government spending and its components 
Up until 1980, government spending in Greece was
significantly smaller than the average for the coun-
tries which became the initial 12 countries of the
euro area (EA-12). In 1970, government spending as
a proportion of GDP was 23 percent in Greece and
34 percent in the (later to become the) EA-12,
whereas in 1980 the corresponding figures were
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4 This is only partly explained by the larger share of agricultural
employment in Greece, and it may well be induced by a privately effi-
cient response to the limits on the size of the firm caused by the high
employment protection legislation. This arises because firm owners
prefer to rely on “flexible”family members to staff the company. The
implications are reflected in the very small average size of Greek
firms. become the) EA-12.5 After a
huge expansion of the pub-
lic sector in Greece in the
1980s, government spending
as a proportion of GDP
had, by 1990, gone above
that of the states that
became the EA-12, the rele-
vant figures being 49 per-
cent for Greece and 48 per-
cent for the EA-12 (OECD
2009). Since the increase in
spending was not accompa-
nied by corresponding in-
creases in government rev-
enue, the explosion in public
debt as well as the prospect
of European Monetary
Union (EMU) participation forced successive Greek
governments in the 1990s to put the brakes on accel-
erating government spending. By 1999, government
spending was down to 44 percent of GDP in Greece
compared with 48 percent in the EA-12 states. It
appears that after gaining entry in the euro area,
Greek policymakers stopped being as vigilant in
their efforts to further curb government spending,
and by 2008 (before the global crisis hit Greece),
government spending stood at 48 percent, climbing
to 52 percent of GDP in 2009. Of particular interest
is the comparison in the evolution of government
spending among the peripheral EU countries. Figure
3.4 shows that by 1997, government spending (as a
percentage of GDP) in Greece had surpassed the
corresponding figures for the average of Ireland,
Italy, Portugal and Spain, whereas by 2008 it had
matched the EU-15 average.
The growth in government spending in Greece is
largely accounted for by the growth in social transfers,
which rose from 8 percent of GDP in 1970 to 21 per-
cent of GDP in 2009, and in the compensation of
public employees (from 8 percent in 1976 to 12.7 per-
cent of GDP in 2009).6 Of particular interest is the
fact that during this period government spending on
gross fixed capital formation (excluding capital trans-
fers received) remained practically unchanged, hover-
ing at around 3 percent of GDP. 
The most important category among income transfers
in Greece is pension benefits. This is the fastest grow-
ing category of social spending, and the biggest risk
regarding the sustainability of public finances in
EEAG Report 2011 100
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Table 3.1  
Demography-related government expenditure 





































Pensions  11.7 7.7  12.4  10.2 1.7 2.4  11.1 2.1 2.8 
Health care  5.0 0.9 1.4 6.7 1.0 1.5 6.7 1.0 1.4 
Long-term care  1.4 0.8 2.2 1.2 0.6 1.1 1.3 0.7 1.4 
Unemployment
benefits 0.3 –0.1 –0.1  0.8 –0.2 –0.2  1.0 –0.2 –0.2 
Education  3.7 –0.3  0.0  4.3 –0.3 –0.2  4.2 –0.3 –0.2 
Total 22.1 9.1  15.9  23.1 2.7 4.7  24.3 3.2 5.2 
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Figure 3.4
5 The low share of government spending until 1980 is noteworthy
given Greece’s large military spending, which has been on average
50 percent larger than what the government spends on education.
The implications of this allocation of public spending for Greece’s
long-run growth potential are beyond dispute. 
6 For the earlier data see Ministry of National Economy (1998),
whereas the recent data are from the Ameco database.EEAG Report 2011 101
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Greece. Government spending on
pension payments was expected
to rise in Greece from 11.7 per-
cent of GDP in 2007 to 19.4 per-
cent in 2035 (for the EU-27 the
rise is expected to be only 1.7 per-
centage points, taking it to
11.9 percent of GDP in 2035). 
Table 3.1 provides long-term pro-
jections for pension spending as
well as for different categories of
demography-related expendi-
tures. The sum of all other age-
related government expenditures
is expected to rise by only 1.4 per-
centage points until 2035 (in con-
trast to the 7.7 percentage points
for pensions alone); the policy
reforms of the pension system adopted in July 2010 as
part of the bailout package may go some way towards
ensuring that the pension system will not be the cause
of recurring fiscal crises like the one the country expe-
rienced in 2010. 
The large growth in general government spending on
public employee compensation (from 8.3 percent of
GDP in 1976, to 12.7 percent in 2009)7 is the result of
considerable increases in both the number of (gener-
al) government employees and in their real wages,
especially during the 1980s. While up to 2000, the
Greek government was spending less (as a percentage
of GDP) than the EA-12 average on wages and
salaries, the inexorable rise in government spending
on employee compensation has pushed it now higher
than the EA-12 average. Between 1976 and the second
quarter of 2010, the number of government employ-
ees almost tripled (from about 282 thousand to
768 thousand8), while private sector employment dur-
ing the same period increased by about 24 percent
(from 2.95 million to 3.66 million); thus, general gov-
ernment employment increased from 8.7 percent of
total employment in 1976 to 17.3 percent in the sec-
ond quarter of 2010. 
Real wages of civil servants received a very large boost
in the 1980s. In 1982 alone, the central government’s
wage bill increased by 33 percent. The growth in pub-
lic sector compensation costs continued in the 1990s
under different guises. Nominal compensation per
employee in public enterprises grew significantly
faster than wages in other sectors. We can see from
Figure 3.5 that the cumulative increase over the peri-
od from 1995 to 2009 in (gross) nominal private sec-
tor compensation per employee (excluding the bank-
ing sector) was 116 percent, whereas the cumulative
increase in the public sector was 159 percent, and in
publicly owned enterprises 221 percent.9 The cumula-
tive increase in nominal GDP during the same period
was equal to 160 percent, the same as the increase in
public sector compensation per employee. We note
that the increase in the economy-wide real compensa-
tion per employee was equal to 39 percent during the
same period, whereas the increase in GDP per
employed person was equal to 35 percent. The
increase in the labour share was thus due to profliga-
cy in the wider public sector,10 a result of the loose
budget constraints that had come with the euro in
some of Europe’s peripheral countries. 
The above-described developments in public sector
pay and employment reflect the fact that public sector
employment has remained a major channel through
which political parties in Greece dispense favours to
partisan voters, as well a “redistributive” tool in peri-
ods of high unemployment (see Demekas and
Kontolemis 2000). The relatively large size of employ-
ment in the public sector, and the desire of the two
contending political parties in Greece to use appoint-
7 These numbers are calculated using data from the Ministry of
National Economy (1998).
8 The use of the word “about” is intentional. The Ministry of
Finance, until June 2010, had no precise idea of the total number of
general government employees. This reflects mainly the unwilling-
ness of various ministries to reveal the number of civil servants
employed in their core operations and in the public enterprises under
their control. A census of civil servants undertaken in July 2010
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9 See Fotoniata and Moutos (2010).
10 From 1995 to 2009, the rise in real private sector wages was small-
er than the rise in business sector productivity (Fotoniata and
Moutos 2010).ments in the public sector to gain
votes, was one of the factors
responsible for why the increases
in public sector wages were con-
sistently above those awarded in
the private sector. The conse-
quence was not only a surge in
government spending but also
increasing reservation wages for
private sector employment,
which undermined the competi-
tiveness of the Greek economy.
Economists call this phenome-
non the Dutch disease after the
difficulties the Dutch economy
once faced when the natural gas
industry absorbed substantial
fractions of the workforce from
industry by outbidding wages. 
3.2.3.2 Sources of government funding
The rise in government revenue only hesitantly fol-
lowed the rise in government spending. While govern-
ment spending relative to GDP rose by 18 percentage
points in the 1980s, government revenue rose by only
5 percentage points (from 27 percent in 1980 to
32 percent in 1990). More adjustment in government
revenue occurred in the 1990s, when its GDP share
rose by 11 percentage points (from 32 percent of GDP
in 1990 to 43 percent in 2000). This brought Greece’s
general government revenue 3 percentage points
below the EU-15 average (and above the average for
the peripheral-4), but by 2009 government receipts in
Greece (at 37 percent of GDP) had again fallen way
below the EU-15 (which stood at 44.3 percent) and
even the peripheral-4 average (which stood at
39.2 percent) – see Figure 3.6. 
Direct taxes (including social security taxes) con-
tributed the most to the rise in government revenue;
whereas in 1976 they were 13 percent of GDP and
47 percent of total government revenue, by 2009 they
had risen to 23 percent of GDP and 59 percent of
government revenue. As a result, the significance of
indirect taxes declined from 46 percent of government
revenue in 1976 to 30 percent in 2009. This reduction
in the importance of indirect taxes was a result of two
forces: first, the harmonisation of indirect taxation in
Greece with those of the (then) EEC in 1980 (the year
prior to Greece’s accession to the EEC) when many
indirect taxes were cut or abol-
ished;11 second, the creation of
the Single Market in 1992, when
more indirect taxes were abol-
ished. Figure 3.7 depicts the evo-
lution of different sources of tax
revenue in total (tax and non-tax)
revenue.
Social security contributions,
which provided 26 percent of
government revenue in 1976, rose
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ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm, data extracted on 11 January 2011; own 
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serie/SelectSerie.cfm, data extracted on 11 January 2011; own calculations.






11 Following Greece’s entry in the EEC in
1981, there was a large decrease of tariff
revenue; whereas in 1974 tariff revenue
contributed 7.5 percent to total tax rev-
enue, by 1982 the share of tariff revenue in
total tax revenue had declined to 1.8 per-
cent, and by 1990 had declined to below
0.1 percent. EEAG Report 2011 103
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to form 31 percent of revenue in 1985, and climbed to
38 percent in 2009. This rise in the importance of
social security contributions in government revenue
came about through large rises in statutory tax rates.
In 1981, the rate for employer social security contri-
butions stood at 18.75 percent, whereas the employee
rate was 10.25 percent. By 2008, these rates had risen
to 28 percent for employers and 16 percent for
employees. The relevant figures for the EU-15 average
in 2008 were 24 percent and 11.4 percent, respectively
(OECD 2008). 
The outline of the Greek tax system shows that
Greece has significantly lower tax revenue (including
social security contributions) than the other EU-15
countries and even lower ones than the other coun-
tries in the periphery (with the exception of Ireland).
In comparison to the EU-15, the lack of total govern-
ment revenue, and of tax revenue, relative to GDP has
been in the range of 6 to 7 percent of GDP in recent
years. 
In addition, the Greek tax system is replete with seri-
ous drawbacks. (Some of the above-mentioned short-
comings of the tax system have been ameliorated by
the 2010 tax reform, which we discuss in Section 3.4).
These have arisen as the tax system has been changing
frequently in ad-hoc fashion to comply with EU reg-
ulations, to generate additional revenue and to reverse
(or sometimes foster) real or perceived inequities of
the tax system. 
Both the issues of equity and efficiency are adversely
affected by the main issue bedevilling Greek public
finances, namely tax evasion. This issue is particular-
ly pertinent among those owning small businesses and
the self-employed (from plumbers and electricians to
medical doctors and lawyers), and it is exacerbated by
the fact that the share of self-employed in total
employment is so high in Greece. That the self-
employed are more likely to tax-evade than those on
dependent employment is well established in the liter-
ature. For example, using US tax audit data, Slemrod
and Yitzhaki (2002) calculated that the rate of under-
reporting of income from dependent employment was
less than 1 percent, whereas the rate at which the self-
employed under-reported their income was close to
58 percent. Assuming that the behaviour of the self-
employed in Greece regarding tax evasion is similar to
that in the United States, the difference in the shares
of self-employment in the two countries (Greece:
30 percent, United States: 7 percent) would explain
most of the difference (about 20 percentage points) in
the estimated size of the shadow economy in the two
countries.12
The distributional implications of tax evasion in
Greece have been found to largely offset some of the
progressive elements of the tax system. Matsaganis
and Flevotomou (2010) have compared the tax
reported incomes of a large sample of income tax
returns in 2004/05 with those observed in the house-
hold budget survey of that year. They found that tax
evasion causes the poverty rate and the poverty gap to
rise above what would have been the case under full
tax compliance, in spite of the fact that in their calcu-
lations the poverty line was allowed to rise to reflect
higher disposable incomes with tax evasion. 
In the past, Greek governments have tried to deal with
tax evasion by inferring an individual’s income on the
basis of “objective criteria” (i.e. presumptive taxa-
tion). This method presumes that a minimum level of
income is required for an individual to own assets or
consumer durables of various sizes or value (e.g.
houses, swimming pools, passenger cars, motor boats)
and to pay for household services (e.g. maids, garden-
ers, drivers, tutors). An individual’s tax obligations
would then be calculated on the higher of their
reported or “objectively calculated” income. Various
other methods have also been tried in the past in order
to infer the income of self-employed individuals (e.g.
in the case of dentists an algorithm based on the years
of practice, the geographical location of the surgery,
the use of dental assistants, etc.). 
Despite the shortcomings of these methods, it is
worth noting that they resulted in higher tax obliga-
tions for many of the professional classes (e.g. medical
doctors, dentists, lawyers, architects), which on aver-
age reported incomes below those earned by manu-
facturing workers. These methods were abandoned a
few years ago in the expectation that the reduction in
statutory tax rates would increase taxpayer compli-
ance. However, the response of the professional class-
es was not as expected since they continued to declare
ridiculously low incomes.13 As a result, the current
Greek government, forced also by the threat of
default, is bringing forward legislation that reinstates
12 Schneider and Enste (2000) and Schneider (2006) estimate the size
of the shadow economy in Greece to be the largest (as a proportion
of GDP) among 21 OECD countries. Their estimates hover between
25 and 30 percent of GDP.
13 For example, according to data released from the Ministry of
National Economy (reported in the Greek newspaper Ta Nea,
www.tanea.gr/default.asp?pid=2&artid=4567727&ct=1, 31 March
2010), among the 151 medical doctors practicing in the most lucrative
(for medical professionals) area of Athens, more than 40 percent of
them reported annual, before-tax, incomes of less than 20,000 euros
in 2008, which is less than the average income for wage earners.(and in some cases reinforces) the
old “objective criteria” for the
calculation of minimum taxable
income. 
In addition to the large rates of
income tax evasion, Greece faces
very high rates of payroll tax eva-
sion. As is to be expected in such
cases, the estimates vary widely.
Studies conducted by the Social
Insurance Foundation (IKA)
estimate that payroll tax evasion
has increased through the years;
the early 1990s’ estimates were
around 13 percent of revenues,
whereas more recent estimates
raise this figure from about
16 percent in 2003 to 20 percent in 2005 (POPOKP
2005). IKA estimated that employers in 10 percent of
all firms inspected in 2008 failed to pay social contri-
butions, while 27 percent of all workers remained
unregistered (Matsaganis et al. 2010). A weak connec-
tion between individual contributions and benefits
has created incentives for collusion between employer
and employee in order to minimise their social securi-
ty contributions. 
On the face of it, successive Greek governments have
tried to implement reforms aimed at increasing the
efficiency of tax collection, mainly through efforts to
curb tax evasion. For example, from 2004 to 2007 new
measures were instituted with the aim of reducing tax
evasion. The most important of these measures were:
(i) the imposition of VAT on new buildings (aimed at
reducing the incidence of informal activity in con-
struction activities), and (ii) the upgrading of the
information technology used for the cross-checking of
tax data and the restructuring of audit services. In
addition, cuts in personal income taxes and measures
to broaden the tax base (through the imposition of a
10 percent tax on dividends and capital gains) and to
simplify the tax system (through a unique property
holding tax) were introduced. Yet, these measures
have not had much effect on tax evasion. A reason for
this is that the measures are mostly piecemeal and do
not take into account all other pieces of existing leg-
islation. Another reason is that recurring tax
amnesties have eroded the credibility of the system by
providing incentives to taxpayers to delay and eventu-
ally evade the payment of taxes. The current Greek
government announced another such “settlement” in
October 2010. A further incentive for tax-evading
behaviour is provided by the existence of deadlines
that permit taxpayers to be absolved of their tax
obligations if the state has not managed to collect the
owed taxes in time. In 2007 alone, around 3.5 billion
euros (about 1.5 percent of GDP) in taxes were writ-
ten off, mainly due to lapses in time for the collection
of the owed tax revenue (State Audit Council 2008).
The failures in collecting taxes and in reigning in
government spending were reflected in the fast accu-
mulation of public debt. The accumulation of pub-
lic debt through successive budget deficits is depict-
ed in Figure 3.8 for the period from 1974 to 2009.14
We note the large deficits of the 1980s and early
1990s which took the debt-to-GDP ratio from
20 percent in 1975 to 100 percent in 1994. The gov-
ernment’s focus on the goal of EMU participation
led to the fiscal consolidation of 1994 to 2000, but
this was reversed after being admitted to the euro
area. The onset of the global financial crisis put an
end to the perception (held by both politicians and
financial markets) that Greek public finances were
sustainable, and by the end of 2009 the public debt-
to-GDP ratio had risen to 127 percent, and the bud-
get deficit for the year is estimated at 15.4 percent of
GDP. 
Given the fast growth in nominal (and real) GDP that
the Greek economy registered from the mid-1990s
until 2008 and the rather moderate (by Greek stan-
dards) deficits recorded during the period, how can






































Source: Ameco: General Government (S13), Expenditure (ESA95), ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/ 
serie/SelectSerie.cfm, data extracted on 11 January 2011; own calculations.
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14 From 1953 to 1973 Greek governments were very prudent and, in
most years, modest annual budget surpluses were recorded. This fis-
cal stance was partly a result of the fact that the country could not
borrow internationally prior to 1966, when the settlement of the
1930s default was finally completed.EEAG Report 2011 105
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one account for the fact that there was not a decline in
the debt-to-GDP ratio? 
To answer this question we decompose the well-
known identity15 describing the accumulation of pub-
lic debt in order to disentangle the relative importance
of the following four factors to debt accumulation:
(i) over-generous programme spending and lax tax
policy (and administration) leading to a primary
deficit even if the economy is operating at potential
output – we call this the structural component; (ii) pri-
mary deficits arising as a result of output being below
potential – the cyclical component; (iii) the (real) inter-
est rate exceeding the GDP growth rate, so that the
debt-to-GDP ratio would rise even if programme
spending and revenues are equal – the rate compo-
nent; (iv) various activities undertaken by the govern-
ment that affect the accumulation of debt but are not
reported as deficit – the stock-flow adjustment.16 The
details of this decomposition are explained in Box 3.1. 
Figure 3.9 presents the annual decomposition of the
debt accumulation, whereas Figure 3.10 presents the
compound effect of the different components.
Starting from 1990, when government debt was
72 percent of GDP, the debt-to-GDP ratio reached
Box 3.1  
Public debt decomposition
The government budget constraint implies that the stock of public debt at the end of period t, Bt, results from
inherited debt at the end of period t-1, Bt–1, plus the budget deficit during period t, Dt:  
1 tt t BDB  =+ . 
Interest payments can be separated from other expenditures, and the accumulation identity can then be rewritten
as: 
1 (1 ) tt t t Br B P D  =+ + ,    (1) 
where PDt is the primary deficit in period t. To account for the effects of growth on the government’s ability to
borrow, after some simple manipulations we can approximate the evolution of government debt in terms of ratios 
to GDP (denoted by lowercase letters): 
11 () tt t t t t bb rg b p d   =  + ,   (2) 
where gt is the growth rate of real GDP. 
An implication of equation (2) is that in order for the debt ratio to be stabilised, the left hand side of (2) must be 
zero, implying that the primary balance should satisfy 
() tt t t pd r g b =  .   (3) 
This implies that when the real interest rate is higher than the growth of real GDP and the debt is positive, the
government must run a primary surplus ( 0 pd < ).
Using equation (2), we can rewrite the debt (-to-GDP ratio) accumulation identity as
**
11 () ( ) tt t t t t t t b b pd pd pd r g b   =+ +  ,   (4) 
where  *
t pd  stands for the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio when GDP is at its potential level. In equation (4) we
now have the debt accumulation consisting of three components. The first component is the structural component
and measures the contribution of the primary deficit to debt accumulation if the economy is operating at full
capacity. The second component is the cyclical component (this is the second term on the right hand side) and 
measures the contribution that the primary deficit makes to debt accumulation as a result of the economy 
operating below capacity. Finally, the third component, which has been called the rate component, measures the
influence of the difference between the (real) interest rate and growth of GDP on the debt-to-GDP ratio.
In order to apply equation (4) in the Greek context, we need to take into account various activities undertaken by
the government that affect the accumulation of debt but are not reported as deficit. These activities are subsumed
under the term stock-flow adjustment (European Commision 2004). Taking into account the stock-flow
adjustment term (sft), the modified equation (4) reads:
**
11 () ( ) tt t t t t t t t b b pd pd pd r g b sf   =+ +  +  .   (5) 
The Ameco database provides estimates for two measures of potential output as well as estimates of the 
cyclically adjusted deficit for both of these measures. Since the results of using either measure of potential output
do not affect, to any significant degree, the contribution of each factor to the evolution of debt, we will present
results based on the sustainable GDP measure.
15 Blanchard (1990), Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini (1993), and Fortin
(1996) present various ways of decomposing the public debt accu-
mulation identity. 
16 The data used in this section relate to debt and deficits as report-
ed by Ameco before the November 2010 revision by Eurostat.113 percent at the end of 2009. Figure 3.10 makes
clear that the rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio by 41 per-
centage points from 1990 to 2009 can be wholly attrib-
uted to the stock-flow effect, which, in the absence of
other forces, would have contributed 62 percentage
points to the debt-to-GDP ratio. (We note that this
conclusion would most likely remain intact had we
used the latest debt and deficit data as revised by
Eurostat in November 2010.) The joint, cumulative
force of the other three components would have sub-
tracted from the debt-to-GDP ratio 21 percentage
points, of which the structural component con-
tributed 12 points, the rate component 8 points and
the cyclical component just 1 percentage point.
What government actions (both before and after
1991) were responsible for this huge contribution of
stock-flow adjustments to the rise
in the debt-to-GDP ratio? The
Greek government had accumu-
lated (especially during the
1980s) large implicit liabilities in
the form of loan guarantees to
“restructured enterprises”, which
became quasi-public entities.
From 1990 to 1993 the govern-
ment took over the long-standing
liabilities of these entities to the
banking system – up to that point
these liabilities were not recorded
in government debt.17 These lia-
bilities (known as “consolidation
loans”) amounted to 1.8 trillion
drachmas (about 5.3 billion
euros), and had by 1992 added
10 percentage points to the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Large stock-flow adjustments were also recorded dur-
ing the 1994 to 2000 period since the second phase of
EMU required a consolidation of government
accounts, especially with the central bank. The gov-
ernment had three accounts with the central bank,
which were overdrawn to the sum of 3.04 trillion
drachmas (about 9 billion euros), all of which had to
be transformed into formal debt by the end of 1993 so
that Greece could enter the second phase of EMU
(see Manessiotis and Reischauer 2001 for more
details). This action alone added another 16 percent-
age points to the debt-to-GDP ratio. In addition to
these very large, debt-increasing, stock-flow adjust-
ments, it is worth mentioning that during the consoli-
dation period some (far smaller) debt-reducing
adjustments were made. These
involved the transfer of Social
Security Fund’s deposits from the
central bank (where they were
held in its own name) to the gov-
ernment’s accounts, as well as the
privatization revenue that was
used to retire public debt. It is
evident that the effort at budget
consolidation that started in 2010
will not be successful if it does
not manage to reign in the cre-
ation of the off-budget liabilities,

























Source: Moutos and Tsitsikas (2010), p. 181.












Source: Moutos and Tsitsikas (2010), p. 182.






17 Large stock-flow adjustments took
place in 1982 and in 1985 as well. These
resulted from previous loans that the
Bank of Greece extended to the govern-
ment in order for the latter to make off-
budget transfers to farmers. EEAG Report 2011 107
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which are still accumulating in
some publicly-owned enterprises.
From Figure 3.9 we observe that
from 1994 to 2000, the structural
component contributed on aver-
age about 4 percentage points per
annum to debt reduction. This
process was reversed gradually
from 2001 to 2009; during this
period the structural component
added on average about 2 per-
centage points per annum to the
increase in the debt-to-GDP
ratio. One may be justified in
thinking that the efforts of Greek
governments to reign in the accu-
mulation of debt were relaxed
after the country gained entry into the euro area,
given that Greek interest rates fell dramatically (see
Chapter 2, Figure 2.1). A more benign interpretation
would take into account the steep rise in spending on
infrastructure necessitated by the 2004 Athens
Olympics and the recent global financial crisis.
Nevertheless, the very large debt-to-GDP ratio left the
country vulnerable to perturbations in the difference
between GDP growth and real interest rates. We note
that due to the low interest rate environment in which
Greece was operating after entering the EMU and
until the onset of the global financial crisis, as well as
the fast growth rates it experienced after 1994, the rate
component did not contribute to debt accumulation
(in fact, it subtracted 8 points18). 
3.2.4 External imbalances
Bringing the government’s
finances in a sustainable position
is a key priority for Greece. Un-
fortunately, this may not be the
main problem; the very high, and
rising, net foreign indebtedness
may be the bigger problem. The
fast growth experienced by the
Greek economy after 1950 (iden-
tified with the initial stages of its
catch-up phase with the ad-
vanced OECD economies), was
associated with significant increases in both the net
and gross saving rate until 1974. For the 35 years since
1974, however, there has been a steady decline in the
saving rate, with the net saving rate dropping by about
32 percentage points, from 20 percent to minus 12 per-
cent.19 This huge drop in the national saving rate has
(since 1988) not been associated with a rise in govern-
ment borrowing, but it is wholly attributable to the
decline in the private sector’s gross saving rate (from
27 percent in 1988 to 11 percent in 2008; see Moutos
and Tsitsikas 2010). 
The decline in the Greek national saving rate is larger
than in any other EU-15 country. Figure 3.11 shows
the net national saving rates for Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal and Spain, whereas Figure 3.12 displays the
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18 See Moutos and Tsitsikas (2010) for
more details.
19 See Figure 3.11. The difference between
gross and net saving is the depreciation of
capital (i.e., capital consumption). United Kingdom and the United
States. Greece and Portugal are
the only countries in the euro
area for which the net national
saving rate turned negative under
the euro, long before the onset of
the global financial crisis in 2008,
another aspect of the soft budget
constraints that prevailed.20
The upshot of the large decline in
national saving for Greece has
been a gradual widening of the
current account deficit and the
accumulation of foreign debt
(Figure 3.13). During its period
of fast growth from 1950 to 1973
(about 7 percent per annum),
Greece ran small current account deficits, which were
on average about 2 percent of GDP. These small cur-
rent account deficits were made up of large deficits in
the trade balance on goods and services (about 7 per-
cent on average) and significant surpluses (about
5 percent on average) on the income and transfers
accounts, mainly reflecting remittances from Greek
seamen and emigrants.
Following the first oil crisis and up to Greece’s acces-
sion to the EEC in 1981, there was a reduction in the
growth rate (to still respectable 4 percent per annum),
and a marked improvement in the trade balance,
which produced a string of current account surpluses.
From 1981 onwards, both the income and trade
accounts started deteriorating (as emigrants started
returning to the home country, and the gradual liber-
alisation of trade took effect), but there was an
improvement in the transfers balance (mainly trans-
fers from the European Union), which, as long as it
lasted, prevented a large deterioration of the current
account. The current account deteriorated sharply
around the year 2000 shortly before Greece was
admitted to the euro area. According to Bank of
Greece figures, the country’s negative net internation-
al investment position stood at about 98 percent of
GDP by the third quarter of 2010 – a result of the
huge current account deficits that were incurred dur-
ing the last 10 years.21
We conclude this section by drawing attention to the
overwhelming influence of the service sector in total
Greek exports (Figure 3.14). The share of services in
total exports increased during the 1990s from an
already high level and has, during
the last decade, been more than
twice as large as the correspond-
ing measure for the EA-12.
Before the crisis, in 2008, trans-
portation services (mainly sea
transport) contributed 56 percent
to the total exports of services,
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20 Among the likely causes of the decline
in the saving rate in Greece is the continu-
ous decline of the share of agricultural
employment (since farmers face greater
income uncertainty than wage earners –
especially government employees), and
the gradual extension of unfunded pen-
sion benefits to a larger part of the popu-
lation. 
21 See Bank of Greece, Statistics, External
Sector, International Investment Position
www.bankofgreece.gr/BogDocumentEn/
International_Investment_Position-
Data.xls, data extracted on 23 January
2011, own calculations.EEAG Report 2011 109
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while travel services (mainly tourism) contributed
another 34 percent.22
During the recent global crisis, the share of services in
total exports decreased in Greece by about 4 percent-
age points from 2008 to 2009, whereas it increased by
about 2.5 percentage points in the EA-12. These dif-
ferential movements reflect the fact that Greece was
earning from transportation services in 2008 as much
as from its total exports of goods (including ships and
oil). The considerable slowdown in world trade in
2009 reduced Greek receipts of transportation ser-
vices by about 30 percent in 2009 relative to 2008. 
3.3 The crisis
The slowdown in global economic activity in 2008,
and the recession in OECD countries in 2009 were the
prelude, but not the cause, of the Greek crisis. With
hindsight we know that Greece had been on an unsus-
tainable path for many years. In fact, it may have been
unfortunate for Greece that the global crisis did not
come earlier – for, in this case, both the public debt-to-
GDP ratio and the net foreign indebtedness-to-GDP
ratio would have been smaller, thus making the
adjustment less painful, and the probability of default
or debt restructuring smaller.
Greece’s inability to access private financial markets is
related to the fact that a constantly increasing share of
its public debt is externally held, which compromises
the perceived ability (and willingness) of the country
to keep honouring its debt obligations to foreigners.
The projected level of net external debt for 2010 is
99 percent of GDP. At the end of
2009 the average net external
debt-to-GDP ratio of the GIPS
countries (Greece, Ireland, Por-
tugal and Spain) stood at about
82 percent (Cabral 2010). 
The current account deficits
incurred after 1997 have been
responsible for increasing the
country’s net foreign debt posi-
tion as a proportion of GDP
from 3 percent of GDP in 1997
to 86 percent by the end of 2009 (IMF 2010b). The
rise by 83 percentage points in net foreign indebted-
ness dwarfs the 25 point rise in the public debt-to-
GDP ratio during the same period (from 102 percent
in 1997 to 127 percent in 2009).
Consistent with these facts, the net borrowing require-
ments of the Greek economy as a proportion of GDP
from 2000 until 2008 were on average 10.6 percent per
annum. During the same period, the average budget
deficit was 5.9 percent per annum. (according to the
data revised by Eurostat in November 2010), implying
that the private sector not only was unable to finance
the government’s budget deficit, but was also an
equally significant net contributor to the rise in the
country’s net foreign indebtedness (Katsimi and
Moutos 2010). 
In addition to the very large trade deficits, the rise in
foreign indebtedness was also fuelled by (i) the grad-
ual decrease in the current and capital transfers, which
Greece was receiving (mainly) from the European
Union, and (ii) the sharp deterioration in the income
account (Figure 3.15). In 1995, the balance on current
and capital transfers was equal to 3.6 percent of GDP
(2.9 on current transfers, and 0.7 on capital transfers).
In 2009, the magnitude for the sum of these transfers
had dropped to just 0.3 percent of GDP. The deterio-
ration in net income receipts was even larger; in 1995
there was a surplus of 2.8 percent of GDP, which by
2009 had turned to a deficit of 2.9 percent.
When a large proportion of public debt is held exter-
nally and debt interest payments to foreigners are a
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22 See Bank of Greece, Statistics, External
Sector, Balance of Payments, Basic Items,
www.bankofgreece.gr/BogDocumentEn/Ba
sic_data_of_Balance_of_PaymentsAnnual
_data.xls, data extracted on 23 January
2011, own calculations.investors may start to question the ability (and/or
willingness) of the government to generate the
resources required for debt service to foreigners. In the
case of Greece, the interest payments made to for-
eigners were 3.8 percent of GDP in 2009. In the first
months of 2010, market estimates for this figure had
it rising to at least 5 percent of GDP in the near
future, under the assumption that interest rates would
not rise – not a small figure by historical standards.23
3.4 The bailout 
In October 2009, the newly elected Greek government
announced that the projected budget deficit for 2009
was 12.7 percent of GDP rather than the 2 percent
displayed in the Greek 2009 budget (approved by
Parliament in December 2008). From this moment
until the formal request for assistance on 23 April
2010, the Greek government attempted to “educate”
the public about the severity of the brewing crisis and
persuade itself that nothing less than the standard
IMF bailout package was the only available option.
As becomes apparent from the events detailed in
Box 3.2, domestic political and economic considera-
tions, including the need to persuade the traditional
voters of the governing party as to the necessity of the
conditionality-based bailout package, were instru-
mental in delaying the official recognition of the lim-
ited choices available to the country.
The total value of the loans to be disbursed to Greece
amounts to 110 billion euros, of which 80 billion are
intergovernmental loans pledged by the euro-area
countries, and 30 billion offered by the IMF. The pro-
jected disbursement of these loans is targeted to meet
Greece’s financing needs up to the first half of 2013.
Table 3.2 provides these details as well as the predict-
ed evolution of government and external debt. 
The euro-area loans carry a variable interest rate, cal-
culated as the three-month Euribor rate plus a charge
of 300 basis points. For amounts outstanding for
more than three years, the charge rises to 400 basis
points. To cover operational costs, a one-off service
fee of 50 basis points is also charged for each drawing.
The euro-area loans are envisaged to carry the same
maturities as IMF lending, i.e., a three-year grace
period and subsequent repayment of principal in
eight equal quarterly tranches. The interest rate for
the IMF loan (30 billion euros) is around 3.3 percent. 
The European Council Decision of 10 May 2010
requires Greece to adopt a number of measures
before the deadlines of end-June 2010, end-September
2010, end-December 2010 and end-March 2011.
According to the Memorandum of Understanding
(see European Commission 2010a, Attachment II,
pp. 59–84) between the Greek government, the
European Commission, the ECB and the IMF, the
adjustment will be frontloaded and will be based
more on permanent expenditure cuts than tax increas-
es. In total, the fiscal consolidation measures24 will
amount to about 20 percent of one year’s GDP over
the 2010 to 2014 period. The total adjustment of
20 percentage points is planned to be spread over the
years, as in Table 3.3. Note that none of these consol-
idation measures force the Greek government to save
and actually reduce its debt. The measures are merely
designed so as to reduce the net increase in debt. 
The adjustment programme, in addition to cuts in the
public sector wage bill and increases in indirect taxa-
tion, includes a wide-ranging reform of the pension
system and structural reform initiatives aimed to
boost the capacity to export and reduce the very large
trade deficit. As noted in Section 3.2, reform of the
pension system is the most important budget item for
fiscal sustainability (see Table 3.1). Projections from
the European Commission (2010a) about the growth
of the public debt with an unreformed pension system
(but with all other consolidation measures in place)
raise the debt-to-GDP ratio to more than 250 percent
by 2050.25
The pension reform adopted by the Greek Parliament
on 8 and 15 July 2010 (for the private and public sec-
tor, respectively) simplifies the current highly frag-
mented pension system, enhances transparency and
fairness, postpones the retirement age and decreases
the generosity of benefits, while preserving an ade-
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23 For example, the interest payments that the Latin American coun-
tries had to make to foreigners were on average about 6 percent of
GDP during the debt crisis of the 1980s (Agénor and Montiel 1996).
The annual reparations that Germany had to make after the initial
period of heavy reparations following the end of World War I
(1924–1931) were less than 3 percent of GDP (Webb 1988). (This fig-
ure does not include the most voluminous reparations, though.
Amongst others, most of Germany’s trading fleet and all patent
rights were transferred, German foreign property was nationalized
and substantial territories (e.g., Alsace) were lost, see Webb 1988).
On the other hand, even 15 years after unification west German
transfers to eastern Germany were about 5 percent of west German
GDP (Sinn 2007, p. 149). IMF (2010a) estimates that for a few years
Greece will have to transfer as much as 5 percent of its GDP as (net)
debt interest payments abroad.
24 The consolidation measures include the, as yet, unidentified ones
as well as those announced by the Greek government before 10 May
2010. 
25 Projections which do not take into account either the consolida-
tion measures or the pension reform of 2010 raise the debt-to-GDP




Timeline of the Greek sovereign debt crisis 
21  October  2009:  The newly elected government notifies Eurostat that the projected government budget 
deficit for 2009 is 12.5 percent of GDP, instead of the 3.7 percent updated projection 
reported in April 2009.  
22 October 2009:    10-year bond spread (over the German bond) remains unchanged at 134 basis points. 
5 November 2009:  Update of government budget reveals an estimated deficit of 12.7 percent of GDP for 
2009, more than six times the initial budget (December 2008) estimate. 
6 November 2009:   10-year bond spread remains at 139 basis points. 
8 November 2009:  Budget draft aims to cut deficit to 8.7 percent of GDP for 2010, and projects public debt to 
rise to 121 percent of GDP in 2010 from 113.4 percent in 2009. 
8 December 2009:    Fitch Ratings cuts Greece's rating to BBB+ from A-, with a negative outlook. 
9 December 2009:    10-year bond spread reaches 247 basis points. 
16 December 2009:  Standard & Poor’s cuts Greece’s rating to BBB+ from A-. 
22 December 2009:  Moody’s cuts Greece's rating to A2 from A1. 
23  December  2009: Parliament adopts the 2010 budget setting a general government deficit target of   
9.1 percent of GDP. 
1 February 2010:    10-year bond spread reaches 270 basis points. 
2 February 2010:   The European Commission adopts (i) a proposal for a Council Decision, in view of the 
excessive deficit correction in Greece by 2012, (ii) a Draft Council Recommendation with 
a view to ending the inconsistency with the broad guidelines of the economic policies, and 
(iii) a Draft Council Opinion on Greece’s Stability Programme. 
3  February  2010:  Greece announces a set of measures in addition to those announced in the Stability 
Programme (freezing wages and raising excise taxes with the aim of reducing the 
government deficit). 
11 February 2010:  European Council invites the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) to adopt 
these documents, and calls on the European Commission to monitor implementation of the 
Council decision and recommendation, in liaison with the ECB and drawing on the 
expertise of the IMF. The euro-area member states declare their readiness to take 
determined and coordinated action, if needed, to safeguard the financial stability in the euro 
area as a whole. 
16  February  2010:  European Council adopts the above-mentioned documents, after discussion in the 
Eurogroup. 
3 March 2010:  Greece announces new deficit-reducing measures of over 2 percent of GDP, including an 
increase in the VAT rates and other indirect taxes and a cut in the wage bill (through the 
reduction in allowances, and partial cancellation of the Easter, summer and Christmas 
bonuses, of civil servants).  
8 March 2010:  Greece submits a report on progress with implementation of the Stability Programme and 
additional measures. 
15 March 2010:  The Eurogroup welcomes the report by Greece, and embraces the European Commission’s 
assessment that the additional measures appear sufficient to safeguard the 2010 budgetary 
targets, if fully implemented. 
25 March 2010:   10-year bond spread drops to 250 basis points. 
25 March 2010:   Heads of state and governments of the euro-area countries reaffirm that they fully support 
the efforts of the Greek government and welcome the additional measures announced on  
3 March, which appear sufficient to safeguard the 2010 budgetary targets. 
8 April 2010:   10-year bond spread reaches 430 basis points. 
11 April 2010:  The Eurogroup reaffirms the readiness by euro-area member states to take determined and 
coordinated action if needed. It highlights that the objective is not to provide financing at 
average euro-area interest rates but to safeguard financial stability in the euro area as a 
whole. 
15 April 2010:   Greece requests “discussions with the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF on a 
multi-year programme of economic policies … that could be supported with financial 
assistance …, if the Greek authorities were to decide to request such assistance”. 
22 April 2010:  Eurostat revises its estimate for the 2009 Greek budget deficit to 13.6 percent. 
22 April 2010:  10-year bond spread rises to 586 basis points. 
23 April 2010:  Greece requests financial assistance from the euro-area member states and the IMF. 
27 April 2010:  Standard & Poor’s downgrades Greece’s debt ratings below investment grade to junk bond 
status. 
27 April 2010:  10-year bond spreads reach 755 basis points. quate pension for the low-middle
income earners – see Box 3.3.
Some further elements of the
pension system are to be re-
formed in 2011.26
Reforms of the tax system were
adopted in April 2010. These
reforms aim at widening the tax
base for household and corporate
income taxation; to this purpose,
the new law has enacted a pro-
gressive tax scale for all sources
of income and a horizontally uni-
fied treatment of income generated by labour and
capital assets. The new law also abrogates all exemp-
tions and autonomous taxation provisions in the tax
system, including income from special allowances
paid to civil servants. These changes, in combination
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3 May 2010:  Greece, the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF announce an agreement on a 
three-year programme of economic and financial policies (see European Commission 
2010a, Attachment II, pp. 59-84). The Eurogroup unanimously agrees to activate stability 
support to Greece via bilateral loans centrally pooled by the European Commission. 
3 May 2010:  ECB announces that it will accept Greek government bonds as collateral no matter what 
their rating is.  
4 May 2010:  The European Commission adopts a Recommendation for a Council Decision according to 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
1) The Draft Decision 
includes the main conditions to be respected by Greece in the context of the financial 
assistance programme. 
6  May  2010:  The Greek Parliament votes to accept a series of policy measures included in the 
programme of economic and financial policies, including an increase in VAT and excise 
taxes, as well as further reductions in public sector wages and pensions. 
6 May 2010:  ECB adopts temporary measures relating to the eligibility of marketable debt instruments 
issued or guaranteed by the Greek government. 
7 May 2010:  10-year bond spread reaches 1038 basis points. 
7  May  2010:  The European Council adopts a Decision according to the TFEU including the main 
conditions to be respected by Greece in the context of the financial assistance programme 
(totalling 110 billion euros).
2) 
9 May 2010:  IMF Executive Board approves the stand-by arrangement (SBA). 
10  May  2010:  The European Council and the EU member states endorse a financial stabilisation 
mechanism. 
10 May 2010:  10-year bond spread falls to 458 basis points. 
18 May 2010:  The euro-area member states disburse the first instalment (14.5 billion euros) of a pooled 
loan to Greece. 
28 June 2010:  10-year bond spread reaches 811 basis points. 
6 July 2010:  10-year bond spread falls to 770 basis points.  
6 August 2010:  Greece submits to the European Council and the European Commission a report outlining 
the policy measures taken to comply with May’s bailout package. 
19  August  2010:  European Commission determines that Greece has met the conditions for the second 
instalment of the 110 billion euros rescue loan after making swift progress in its budgetary 
reform efforts. 
8 September 2010:  10-year bond spread reaches 975 points. 
15  November  2010:  Eurostat revises upwards its estimate for the 2009 government budget deficit to   
15.4 percent of GDP. 
14 January 2011:  Fitch Ratings downgrades Greek bonds from BBB- to BB+. 
 




Greek public sector financing requirements and loan disbursements 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
(in billion euros) 
Financing gap  31.5  46.5  24.0  8.0 
  of which: EU  (8/11 of the gap) 21.1  36.6  17.5  5.8 
 IMF (3/11 of the gap) 10.4  9.9  6.5  2.2 
Total government debt  327.4  348.4  363.8  375.4 
 (%  of  GDP) 
Gross external debt  187.5  192.7  199.1  203.3 
of which: public sector  135.6  137.8  141.8  141.4 
private  sector  52.0 54.9 57.2 61.9 
Source: IMF (2010b), p. 42. 
26 In the absence of complete long-term projections, it is not yet pos-
sible to have a complete assessment of the pension reform. The main
pension parameters will have to be adjusted in the course of 2011 to
ensure that the long-term evolution of pension expenditure
(2009–2060) does not exceed 2.5 percent of GDP. This adjustment
will be based on long-term projections to be provided by the
National Actuarial Authority and validated by the EU Economic
Policy Committee. EEAG Report 2011 113
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with a number of administrative actions (e.g. upgrad-
ing of software for purposeful auditing and execution
of tax audits on the basis of known data, electronic
tracking and monitoring of the fuel market for the
purposes of combating the black market, verification
of the origin of assets for all tax officials and intro-
duction of measures against officials whose assets
cannot be justified by their income) are expected to
help increase tax compliance and reduce tax evasion. 
The extra measures undertaken since May 2010
include an increase in the standard VAT rate from
21 to 23 percent and in the reduced rate from 10 to
11 percent, moving lower taxed products such as util-
ities, restaurants and hotels to the standard VAT rate,
and increasing excises on fuel, cigarettes and other
tobacco to bring them in line with EU averages. The
remaining measures include higher assessment of real
estate, a temporary crisis levy on profitable firms, pre-
sumptive taxation (for the self-employed), taxes and
levies on unauthorized establishments and buildings,
and new gaming royalties and license fees. 
Similarly, in addition to the ex-
penditure cuts (mainly on wages
and bonuses of public sector
workers) undertaken before
May 2010, the government has
decided to reduce the public
wage bill by reducing the Easter,
summer and Christmas bonuses
to civil servants (these are total-
ly eliminated for those earning
more than 2,000 euros per
month) and to pensioners with
pensions above 800 euros per
month. Pensioners receiving
more than 1,400 euros per
month will face a levy of 10 per-
cent on any amount they receive
above it. Other expenditure cuts
involve public-sector employ-
ment reductions, cuts in discre-
tionary and low priority invest-
ment spending, untargeted
social transfers, consolidation of
local governments and lower
subsidies to public enterprises.
Beyond fiscal-related issues,
important steps forward have
also been made with the ambi-
tious broader structural reform
agenda. Business environment
reforms, measures to accelerate
absorption of structural and cohesion funds, and
legislation to implement the Services Directive have
been instituted. The government also plans to pri-
vatize and restructure state-owned companies – in
particular in the areas of rail transport and energy.
Of particular importance for the bailout package
are the new labour market laws that were adopted
on 15 July 2010, aimed at reducing the strictness of
employment protection legislation and dismantling
the obstacles to temporary and part-time employ-
ment. These include provisions to reduce the cost to
firms of severance payments and facilitate collec-
tive dismissals; the new law also reduces the over-
time premium27 and introduces a sub-minimum
wage to be applied to newly recruited workers
younger than 25 years old (84 percent of minimum
wage). 
Table 3.3  
Consolidation measures and budget accounting







2009 deficit 36 150 15.4   
nominal deficit drift in 2010  4 183 1.8   
identified measures 18 000 18 000 7.8  7.8 
impact of nominal GDP growth  –  –0.2   
2010 deficit 22 333 9.6   
nominal deficit drift in 2011  9 345 4.1   
identified measures 14 800 32 800 6.5  14.4 
impact of nominal GDP growth  –  –0.1   
2011 deficit (target)  16 877 7.4   
nominal deficit drift in 2012  6 198 2.7   
identified measures 5 575 38 375 2.4  16.6 
unidentified measures  2 584 2 584 1.1  1.1 
impact of nominal GDP growth  –  0.1   
2012 deficit (target)  14 916 6.4   
nominal deficit drift in 2013  1 687 0.7   
identified measures 575 38 950 0.2  16.3 
unidentified measures  4 629 7 213 1.9  3.0 
impact of nominal GDP growth  –  0.2   
2013 deficit (target)  11 399 4.8   
nominal deficit drift in 2014  –503 –0.2   
identified measures –1 050 37 900 –0.4  15.4 
unidentified measures  5 561 12 774 2.3  5.2 
impact of nominal GDP growth  –  0.2   
2014 deficit (target)  6 385 2.6   
Notes: Deficit in a year equals the deficit in the previous year plus deficit
drift in the year minus the the sum of identified and unidentified measures
(to calculate the ratios, the impact of the measures on nominal GDP growth
is also taken into account). Deficit drift measures the increase in the deficit
that would take place without the measures, due, for example, to structural
increases in pension expenditure and unemployment benefit payments.
Source: European Commission (2010b), p.17.
27 This measure will possibly clash with the objective of promoting
part-time employment and work-sharing.Further initiatives that are on the agenda include
extending probationary periods for new jobs from two
months to one year; facilitating the use of temporary
and part-time contracts, as well as increasing flexibil-
ity in working hours; clarifying
the legal framework for collective
bargaining to ensure that there is
a clear legal framework for firm
level agreements, with the aim of
allowing firm-level agreements to
prevail over other levels; reform-
ing the arbitration system, so as
to guarantee non-interference
from the government. 
The social partners have also
recently concluded a national
general collective bargaining
agreement with a three-year
horizon, which foresees a wage
freeze for 2010 and wage in-
creases as of July 2011 and July
2012 equal to the HICP for the
European Union in 2010 and
2011, respectively. Moreover,
new legislation enacted in July
2010 forbids sectoral or enterprise unions from tak-
ing to arbitration wage demands that exceed the lim-
its set by the collective agreement, and renders void
recently concluded decisions by the arbitration
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Box 3.3  
Pension reform (July 2010)
Main elements of the pension reform are:
• Introduction of a new basic pension of 360 euros per month. For those with less of 15 years of contributions,
and thus not eligible for the contributory pension, the basic pension is means-tested, and provides an
important social safety net.
• Accrual rates (i.e. the rate at which pension rights accumulate for each year of pensionable employment) in
the old system varied significantly across pension funds. The new system introduces accrual rates with the 
same profile for all workers that depend only on the length of the career (ranging from 0.8 to 1.5 percent of
earnings). The new accrual rates are significantly lower than those in the old system (ranging from 2 to
3 percent), reducing the system’s over-generosity.
• Under the previous rules, retirement was allowed on a full pension at age 60 and in some cases even earlier.
The reform increases the statutory retirement age to 65, and the minimum age for retirement is set at 60. If a
person retires between 60 and 65 without having a full contributory period, their pension will be reduced by
6 percent per year before reaching 65 years of age.
• The full contributory period will increase from the current 35 years (or even lower, for some categories) to
40 years.
• As from 2021, the minimum and statutory retirement ages will be adjusted in line with changes in life 
expectancy every three years.
• Equalization of retirement age of men and women in both the private and public sector by 2013. Moreover,
the indexation of benefits will not exceed HICP inflation.
• Pensionable earnings will be calculated based on the full-earnings history. In the old system only five years
(with the best earnings) of the 10 last years before retirement were used to determine pensionable earnings.
• A substantial revision of the list of heavy and arduous professions, aiming at reducing substantially the 
coverage to no more than 10 percent of the employees, is underway, and it will apply from 1 July 2011 for all
workers.
Table 3.4  
Macroeconomic developments 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Annual percentage change 
GDP –2.3  –4.3  –3.2 1.1 2.1 
Private consumption  –1.8  –4.1  –4.3  0.5  1.1 
Public consumption 7.6  –9.0  –8.5  –6.0  –1.0 
Gross fixed cap. formation  –10.4  –17.4  –7.5  –2.6  1.1 
HICP 1.3 4.7  1.7  0.5  0.7 
Unit labour costs total 
economy 4.1  –0.6  –0.7  0.1  –0.2 
Total exports  –20.0  0.6 5.1 6.0 7.4 
Total imports –18.6  –12.0  –6.4  –1.5  1.5 
% of GDP
Current account balance  –14.0  –10.6  –8.0  – 6.5  –5.2 
Net borrowing from the RoW –12.9  –9.5  –6.7  –5.1  –3.7 
General government deficit –15.4  –9.6  –7.4  –6.4  –4.8 
Primary government balance  –10.1  –3.3  –0.8  1.1  3.5 
General government gross debt 126.8  141.2  152.6  156.9  157.3 
Unemployment rate 9.5 12.4  15.5  15.0  14.6 
Source: For GDP growth rate, HICP (inflation), and unemployment rate:
EEAG forecast up to 2011. For 2012 and 2013, for the same variables, IMF 
(2010b, Table 7). For all other variables, European Commission (2010b,
Annex 4).EEAG Report 2011 115
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authorities that involve wage increases above those
decided by the collective agreement. 
The predicted evolution of the main macroeconomic
variables is described in Table 3.4. These forecasts
indicate that the government is expected to start run-
ning primary surpluses from 2012 onwards, thus mak-
ing it possible for the public debt-to-GDP ratio to
start declining after 2013. However, these projections
are all based on Greece returning to economic
growth, which is dubious for the time being. The ques-
tion of what is to be done if the Greek government
implements all the changes agreed in the
Memorandum, yet the macroeconomic outcomes
turn out to be significantly worse than the ones
assumed in Table 3.4 will be discussed in the following
section. 
We note the obvious: any projection that has public
sector external debt stabilising at around 150 percent
of GDP implies that small deviations in the assumed
parameters of the simulation exercise (e.g. the
assumed growth rate) can delay the actual stabilisa-
tion and make lenders jittery about the government’s
solvency.
3.5 Will the bailout package prove enough?
In this section we examine some factors (both eco-
nomic and political) that may prove crucial in deter-
mining the successful transition of Greece from the
official financing of the European Union and the
IMF to market financing of its debt. 
3.5.1 Economic considerations 
In 2009, Greece’s (gross) external debt stood at
170 percent of GDP, with the public sector debt
(including public enterprises) being equal to 111 per-
cent and private debt at 59 percent of GDP. The net
foreign debt was estimated to be about 86 percent of
GDP. Table 3.2 reveals that by 2010, the (gross) exter-
nal debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to rise to 187 per-
cent, with the public sector increasing its debt-to-
GDP ratio to 135 percent and the private sector
deleveraging to 52 percent. The subsequent evolution
of both ratios is expected to reach, in 2013, 141 per-
cent and 62 percent, respectively. 
One thing that stands out in the (baseline) predictions
of both the European Union and the IMF is their
homophony regarding a policy scenario that is full of
uncertainties, with the evolution of the global and
European economies being of decisive role in this
respect. Some predictions are more open to debate
than others. Consider, for example, the prediction that
GDP is set to contract by 4.2 percent in 2010 and
3 percent in 2011, following a set of fiscal consolida-
tion measures equivalent to about 8 percent of GDP
in 2010 and 6.5 percent in 2011. For these GDP fore-
casts to materialize, global economic recovery and, in
particular, world trade recovery must not slow down. 
Furthermore, the European Union and the IMF
have factored in their projections substantial
declines in the spread at which both the government
and the private sector borrow, and an easing of the
credit crunch.28 This may or may not come to pass.
Given the stringent credit environment for private
sector borrowers that existed in Greece in the first
half of 2010 and the defensive process of deleverag-
ing in the domestic banking sector, a substantial
improvement is required if the credit crunch is not to
combine with the fiscal contraction to produce a
very large drop in output. 
It should be noted that the European Union and IMF
predictions apply to the officially measured GDP.
Reforms aimed at transferring activities from the
shadow to the official economy may add 1 to 2 per-
centage points to measured GDP, thus masking a big-
ger decline in actual GDP than the one predicted. 
The development of the unemployment rate may be
of critical importance for the political sustainabili-
ty of the fiscal consolidation programme. The pro-
jected increase in the unemployment rate, which is
assumed to peak at 15 percent in 2012 and decline
to 14 percent in 2014, is very likely an underesti-
mate. Simple estimates of an Okun’s law relation-
ship for Greece using different specifications and
data periods provide estimates of the path of the
unemployment rate that are much higher than the
predicted values by the European Union and the
IMF, even if the GDP growth projections are taken
at face value.
28 The corporate sector in Greece has, so far, continued to suffer from
the credit crunch since non-sovereign bond spreads have followed the
rise of the sovereign bond spreads. For example, in November 2009,
both the sovereign CDS spread and the CDS spread of the main
banks in Greece stood at about 200 basis points. By the end of May
2010, both had risen to about 630 basis points. Very likely this
reflects, among other things, the increased correlation between sov-
ereign and banking risks due to the significant holdings of govern-
ment debt securities by banks in their portfolios. This rise in the costs
for banks has been transferred to the non-financial corporate sector. For the foreign lenders who will be called on to provide
the financing after the bailout package expires in the
second quarter of 2013, the ability of the country to
service its (foreign) debt obligations will be a key con-
cern. According to the European Commission sce-
nario, the country’s net borrowing needs in 2013 will
be equal to 3,7 percent of GDP. Is it likely that foreign
lenders will be willing to step in and provide financing
to a public sector whose external debt is about 150 per-
cent of GDP at spreads of only 100 basis points (IMF
2010a), without any implicit guarantees from interna-
tional institutions such as the European Union and
the IMF? (In its latest scenario the IMF (2010b)
assumes that spreads will be 300 basis points in 2013.)
We are also not convinced that foreign lenders will
have such a short memory of the near default in 2010
and that they will not require a higher risk premium to
lend to an admittedly reformed country, but whose
accumulated debts make it very vulnerable to small
deteriorations in the international environment. 
The previous paragraph assumes that the predictions of
the bailout package regarding the trade and current
account deficits will come to pass by the second quarter
of 2013. But external accounts data from the first nine
months of 2010 suggest that the predicted improvements
may not be forthcoming. Consider the (provisional) data
for the first nine months of 2010 provided by the Bank
of Greece.29 The level of the current account balance for
January to September 2010 shows a very small improve-
ment over the relevant 2009 magnitude; according to
these data the drop of the current account deficit relative
to GDP is less than 0.3 percentage points. Similarly, net
exports of goods and services show an improvement of
less than 1 percentage point (over the 2009 figure). The
sum of the current account balance and the capital
transfers balance (i.e. net borrowing in the Ameco
nomenclature) shows deterioration! 
The above arguments illuminate the very narrow path
on which the Greek economy must tread during its
adjustment towards fiscal and external sustainability.
On the one hand, in order to reduce the budget deficit,
slow down the rise in the public debt-to-GDP ratio
and quickly place it on a downward trend, it needs the
reduction in GDP in 2010 and 2011 to be as small as
possible, and rise fast thereafter. On the other hand,
given the absence of the exchange rate as an instru-
ment to regain the loss in competitiveness and the
slow pace of internal devaluation, any improvements
in the current account will have to rely on a sharp
internal devaluation with declining prices, wages and
a drop in GDP so as to compress imports. Alter-
natively, all hope for an improvement in the current
account will have to rest on fast increases in world
income and trade so as to export its way out of the
crisis; the current world economic environment is not
a good portent in this respect. Our back-of-the-enve-
lope calculation (see Section 3.6.1) suggests that the
“required”drop in GDP is probably much larger than
what is predicted in the Memorandum. 
It would not surprise us if the European Union and
the IMF have similar reservations about their baseline
scenario, yet are not willing to draw attention to the
issue that the probability that Greece will not be able
to return to the markets to roll over its debt at default-
avoiding spreads is not negligible. 
3.5.2 Political considerations
We take it for granted that both the European Union
and the IMF have a strong stakeholder interest in the
eventual success of the bailout package. The IMF has
also learned from previous crises that building a wide
albeit lukewarm domestic support for the fiscal con-
solidation and reform package is key for the political
sustainability of the effort. 
From the moment the newly elected government
appeared to understand the gravity of the situation, a
serious effort was made to reverse the widespread
belief that an IMF-style programme would be politi-
cally infeasible. The government seems, up to this
point, to have managed to persuade a large propor-
tion of the population of the inevitability of the aus-
terity measures coming in exchange for the bailout
programme. This effort was aided in no small measure
by using the media to expose gross cases of tax eva-
sion and public sector corruption (which it promised
to prosecute), as well as cases of under-worked and
over-paid public sector employees. Some evidence of
the acceptance (albeit grudgingly) of the policies
implied by the bailout package is provided by the lat-
est Eurobarometer, which reports results of interviews
conducted between 7 and 25 May in Greece, when
most of the details of the bailout package had already
been reported in the press (Eurobarometer 2010). In
response to the statement: “In a international finan-
cial and economic crisis, is it necessary to increase
public deficits to create jobs”, more people in Greece
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Payments, Basic Items, www.bankofgreece.gr/BogDocumentEn/
Basic_data_of_Balance_of_Payments-Annual_data.xls, data extract-
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than in any other European country have stated that
they disagree (for Greece, 37 percent “agree” and
53 percent “disagree”; for the EU-27, 46 percent
“agree” and 36 percent “disagree”). Given that public
sector employment has remained a main tool through
which political parties in Greece dispense favours to
partisan voters, as well a “redistributive” tool in peri-
ods of high unemployment, this change in attitudes is
an indication that the current government has suc-
ceeded in refashioning the public debate about the
role of the public sector in the economy. 
A crucial determinant of the political feasibility of
the bailout package is the response of the trade union
movement. Public sector unions are fragmented along
party lines. This is a result of the overwhelming pene-
tration of the state bureaucracy by the two political
parties (New Democracy and PASOK) that alternat-
ed in government since 1974. The absence of a strong
and confident bureaucracy in Greece allowed the
political parties to have an excessive influence on per-
sonnel choice and promotion to potentially lucrative
posts. In effect, this meant that able civil servants had
to “take sides” and “declare their allegiance” with a
particular political party/trade union association, if
they wanted to avoid being left behind in their careers
while other less able employees were promoted.30
Currently, the majority, and the president, of the exec-
utive council of public sector workers (ADEDY) are
trade unionists who are politically affiliated with the
governing party, whereas the second largest fraction is
affiliated with the Conservative Party. 
The close connection between PASOK and the lead-
ership of the trade union movement implies that, on
the margin and despite the strong rhetoric against
the reforms on which the bailout package is condi-
tioned, the reaction to the so-called “curtailment of
the fundamental rights of the working people” will
be more restrained than what may have been the
case if New Democracy was in power. However,
even a friendly trade union leadership may not be
able to contain the wishes of the rank and file if
unemployment rises steeply and extra tax-raising
measures are imposed. 
From the four opposition parties in Parliament, both
New Democracy (the main opposition and the party
in government during the period from 2004 to 2009),
and the parties of the Left, voted in Parliament
against the austerity measures. (A populist party with
nationalistic overtones voted in favour.) This appears
to have influenced voter perceptions about the relative
suitability of the two main parties to steer Greece
through the economic minefield that lies ahead, as
reported in a Greek Public Opinion poll released on
30 August 2010.31 When asked which party’s policy
they trusted most to resolve the economic crisis,
31 percent said PASOK, 13.4 percent said New
Democracy and 39.5 percent said none. Thus,
PASOK appears to be trusted more than all other par-
ties put together. Moreover, among New Democracy
voters, only 38.4 percent agree with the party’s pro-
posals on economic policy. (Among PASOK voters,
62.7 percent agree with the party’s – i.e., the govern-
ment’s – economic policy.) 
The political dynamics so far seem to indicate that the
current government has been able to build sufficient
support for the reforms in the bailout package. Yet
considerable dangers remain, as the full extent of the
economic problems Greece faces has not been
revealed to the public. It would not be surprising if
the elites switched in favour of default in case they
thought that their power to shape policy in Greece
could be compromised by policy proposals of the out-
side actors that go beyond the usual austerity mea-
sures or if the economic situation turned much worse
than the IMF predicts, as we fear. The elites may also
find other allies in this case (in addition to the rising
numbers of the unemployed): the small business own-
ers (many of them shopkeepers with either no or just
one or two employees) who suffer disproportionately
from the drop in consumption spending and have
small room for adjustment. The fact that both the left-
wing parties and the main right-wing party are
opposed to the bailout package suggests that the dan-
ger that an “unnatural” coalition may be formed in
the medium-term should not be ignored.
3.6 The day after (June 2013)
The arguments of the previous section suggest that it
is likely that Greece will not be able to return to the
private financial markets at default-avoiding interest
rates when the current bailout package expires, even if
30 The upshot of these practices has been reflected in the misreport-
ing of data regarding public debt and deficits by the Greek Statistical
Service (ESYE). Although ESYE’s past officials have claimed that
they had no way of verifying the soundness of the data sent to them
from various government or quasi-government entities, it is hard to
avoid the conclusion that the “capture” of many aspects of public
administration by the political parties had affected the diligence with
which some of the high-ranking employees of ESYE were carrying
their duties (see Moutos and Tsitsikas 2010, for more details about
how successive governments could count on the “goodwill” of some
ESYE officials).
31 See  www.tovima.gr/default.asp?pid=2&artid=351256&ct=32&dt
=30/08/2010, 30 August 2010.the Memorandum’s policies are implemented.
Moreover, it may well be the case that Greece’s cur-
rent account situation will not have improved suffi-
ciently with the austerity measures taken, which will
force a further downward adjustment of the Greek
economy and reduce the chance that the country will
be able to redeem its debt even further.
The question is: What will happen if, as we expect,
Greece’s problems will not be resolved by 2013, in
particular if the huge current account deficit is still
unsustainable? Apart from a debt moratorium, which
we discuss below, there are in principle only three
options. 
i) Greece returns to the drachma and depreciates
(external depreciation)
ii) Greece goes through an equally radical internal
depreciation process during which wages and prices
fall by the same amount relative to the rest of the euro
area as they would have done with an external depre-
ciation.
iii) The European Union finances the Greek current
account deficit with ongoing transfer programmes. 
The first two of these options are mutually exclusive,
but blends of the third and either the first or the sec-
ond options are possible. We will now discuss these
three options in more detail. 
3.6.1 External and internal depreciation: 
the similarities
From a political perspective a policy of exiting from
the euro, returning to the drachma and allowing a
depreciation to take place looks very different from an
austerity programme that tightens Greek budget con-
straints, as less capital is flowing into the country.
However, from an economic perspective the differ-
ences are smaller than may appear at first glance.
Thus we first point out the similarities before we
emphasize the differences. 
The two policies have in common that they make
Greek exports cheaper internationally and imports
more expensive internally, such that, in principle, a
boost in exports and a decline in imports can be
expected that reduces the trade deficit and the deficit
in the current account, which by definition then
means a reduction in capital imports.
They also have in common that they both come about
because capital is shying away from Greece due to the
increased default probability perceived by investors. If
the exchange rate is flexible this leads to depreciation,
and if it is fixed, the tighter budget constraint for the
Greek government means that the public sector has to
be scaled down in terms of reducing the number of
jobs, lowering salaries and reducing public purchases
of privately produced goods, all of which reduces
aggregate demand and forces the private sector to cut
down wages and prices. 
In the case of an external depreciation the change in
effective exchange rates comes about overnight as the
drachma will immediately lose value. In the case of an
austerity programme, there is a more extended period
of stagnation, wage and price cuts leading ultimately
to the same result. 
Both policies will increase the burden of the external
debt. As the external debt is defined in terms of euros,
the decline in the euro-value of Greek GDP that an
external devaluation will bring about will increase the
ratio of foreign debt to GDP. The same is true after an
internal depreciation, because it also implies a decline
in the euro-value of Greek GDP (Corsetti 2010). By
the end of 2010 the ratio of net foreign debt to GDP
was about 100 percent in Greece. If the country
undergoes an internal or external devaluation of, say,
a third, this ratio would increase to 150 percent. Thus
private and public debt moratoria by which foreign
creditors, mostly banks, relinquish some of their
claims against Greece will become likely.
While both – internal and external depreciation – can
be expected to improve the current account, they will
not be able to do so immediately. In fact, it is even
likely that there will be an adverse reaction of the cur-
rent account in the short-run, as import and export
quantities will need some time to react, while export
prices decline, reducing the export value in terms of
euros. Until a normal reaction of the current account
and trade balance, which is driven by increasing
export and falling import quantities, can be expected,
a number of years may pass. 
Even then, however, it is doubtful whether export val-
ues will go up after a depreciation, as price and quan-
tity effects work in opposite directions. This is partic-
ularly obvious for tourism, which is a substantial part
of Greek exports. While falling prices will certainly
bring more tourists to Greece, it is unclear whether
the Greek revenue from tourism will increase, as there
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is less revenue per tourist. A similar caveat is appro-
priate for transportation services (mainly sea trans-
port), which is an even stronger component in
Greece’s exports. Since the “costs” of producing sea
transport services are almost independent of domestic
cost developments in Greece, the trade surplus gener-
ated by this sector is more or less fixed in euro terms
(but dependent on developments in world trade –
which are independent of Greek depreciation). 
Thus nearly all of the adjustment in the trade balance
will have to come via the import side (as well as from
any rise in Greek exports due to the increases in world
income and world trade). After an external or internal
depreciation, Greek income in terms of euros will fall,
and hence fewer imports can be afforded. 
Fortunately, the declining euro value of Greek
incomes does not mean that the living standard falls
in proportion, as prices of local goods and services,
which are the lion’s share of Greek expenditures, will
also fall. If the depreciation process is balanced, the
prices of goods will fall inversely to their import con-
tent, and prices of local services will fall more or less
by the same proportion as incomes fall. Thus, for
example, restaurants will remain affordable, but cars
will often become too expensive.
It is an open question how large the internal or exter-
nal depreciation will have to be. Some back-of-the-
envelope calculation may help to get a feeling for nec-
essary magnitudes. Suppose the income elasticity of
Greek imports is 1, then a 1 percent decline in the
euro-value of Greek GDP reduces the euro-value of
imports by 1 percent, and assume that for the reasons
given in the text, the euro-value of exports will not
react to a depreciation, and that there will be no
increase in Greek exports due to the rebound in world
income and world trade. Then, to eliminate a current
account deficit of 11 percent one needs a drop in
GDP of 11 percent divided by m, where m is the
import share of GDP. In Greece the import share is
about a third. Thus the reduction in Greek GDP nec-
essary to get rid of the entire current account deficit
would be 33 percent.
However, the income elasticity of imports may be a
bit above one, given that imports are typically superi-
or goods that decline more than proportionately with
incomes. An extreme possibility would be an elastici-
ty of 2, which means that imports decline twice as
much as income. In this case a real devaluation and a
decline in the euro value of Greek GDP by 16.5 per-
cent is required. (Taking into account the rise in
Greek exports due to the rise in world trade would not
affect these calculations to a great extent since exports
are a low share of GDP in Greece.)
It may be revealing in this context that Latvia under-
went a substantial internal devaluation in 2009 that
reduced the euro-value of its GDP by 19 percent.
Such orders of magnitude should not be considered to
be implausible, also for Greece. 
The current account deficit will not necessarily have
to be eliminated entirely. After all, when GDP increas-
es, so can the net foreign debt position of Greece,
without increasing the ratio of foreign debt to GDP.
However, the necessary internal or external deprecia-
tion means that the euro-value of Greek GDP will
have to fall before it will again be able to rise. Thus,
envisaging a growth scenario for Greece that could
justify aiming at less than the elimination of current
account deficit might be a bit optimistic under present
circumstance. 
3.6.2 The differences between external and internal 
depreciation
While there are crucial similarities between an inter-
nal and external depreciation, the differences should
not be overlooked. 
As argued above, both kinds of depreciation will be
enforced by a shortfall of capital willing to flow to
Greece because of a rapidly changed assessment of
the default probability on the part of international
investors. 
In a currency union, the tightening in the public and
private budget constraints will lead to a reduction in
aggregate demand. This causes a real contraction of
the economy with increasing unemployment to the
extent that wages and prices are sticky and do not
flexibly react to the changed economic conditions.
Over time, wages and prices will however have to
come down, which helps the economy recover and
improve the employment situation. 
With flexible exchange rates, by way of contrast, when
prices and wages are quoted in drachma, the euro
prices and wages will automatically come down when
international investors shy away from Greek assets
because there is an immediate depreciation. Drachma
prices of services and non-traded goods withoutimport content can remain unchanged, and the drach-
ma prices of other goods will only have to increase in
proportion to their respective import content. As
prices and wages are usually stickier downward than
upward, and fewer price changes will be necessary, the
economy finds its new equilibrium faster after an
external than after an internal depreciation. 
A price and wage decline is the precondition for the
economy to regain its competitiveness in both kinds
of depreciation. However, while an external deprecia-
tion achieves this through a mere exchange rate
adjustment, the internal depreciation needs a reces-
sion and real economic contraction to bring this same
result about. 
Keynes argued long ago that this is the crucial dis-
tinction between external and internal depreciation.
While it is conceivable to orchestrate a price and wage
cut that mimics an external depreciation, as tiny
Latvia has recently shown, the process is difficult in a
comparatively large economy with a large variety of
diverging interests, many more prices and a compara-
tively weak government. The workers who will first be
called on to accept a reduction in their nominal wages
will not happily acquiesce to it until they are sure that
all other workers will also accept a reduction in their
wages. Moreover, the workers as a group cannot be
certain that their sacrifice will be met with a corre-
sponding fall in the cost of living, since producers
may not pass on their reduction in wage costs to
prices. The political skill required to effect substantial
decreases in thousands of wages and millions of prices
is considerable. If the process is not well orchestrated
politically and only works itself through the economy
via the squeezing of public and private budget con-
straints, it is likely to lead to riots and political desta-
bilisation. 
However, an external depreciation also has extremely
problematic implications, the most obvious one being
a bank run. As soon as the rumour of a possible
return to the drachma spreads, people will try to
secure their money by emptying their bank accounts,
and as no bank has the (base) money it shows on its
deposits, banks would quickly become illiquid. Thus,
such a policy would need to be supplemented with an
appropriate auxiliary programme by the ECB or the
European Union, providing Greek banks with the
necessary liquidity. If such help is not organised, a
Greek exit from the euro area would have all the man-
ifestations of a currency crisis for the new drachma,
like the ones we have seen in East Asia and in Latin
America since the early 1990s. If badly managed, the
currency conversion could have similarly devastating
implications for real economic activity as an internal
depreciation (see Krugman 1999 and Aghion et al.
2000). 
A major difficulty that comes with a depreciation is
the mismatch of assets and liabilities in the balance
sheets of banks and companies of the real economy,
and here again there are substantial differences
between an internal and an external depreciation. 
After both kinds of depreciation the balance sheets of
ordinary companies of the real economy come in dis-
order, because the euro-values of the real assets, such
as real estate property and, to some extent, equipment
capital, will fall while the euro-value of liabilities may
not fall as much or not fall at all. 
The latter is the case after an internal depreciation. As
debt contracts are made in nominal euro terms, the
liabilities will not be affected, but the general price
decline will devalue companies’ real assets, driving
many of these companies into bankruptcy. This will
hurt their creditors, above all the banking system. 
After an external depreciation, the euro-value of real
assets in normal companies will likewise decline; only
the liabilities to foreigners, which typically are of
minor importance, will remain fixed. Liabilities to
domestic creditors, the banking system in particular,
will have been converted to drachma and will there-
fore decline in euro terms, which is a substantial relief.
Thus, in the real economy, the probability of default
of normal companies will be smaller after an external
depreciation than after an internal one.
Under which kind of regime the financial sector will
fare better is not quite clear. At first glance it seems
that it will not be affected by an internal devaluation.
After all, both its assets and liabilities are determined
in euros. By contrast, an external devaluation that fol-
lows a conversion of balance sheets into drachma will
create substantial disorder, because claims and liabili-
ties to foreigners will remain fixed in euro terms while
claims and liabilities to domestic residents are fixed in
terms of drachma. As Greek banks are net borrowers
abroad and net lenders at home, the external depreci-
ation will probably hurt them by shrinking the euro-
value of their assets more than shrinking the euro-
value of their liabilities. However, this analysis forgets
the additional write-off losses on claims against the
companies of the real economy that will be driven
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into bankruptcy after an internal depreciation. If
these write-off losses are taken into account, it is not
clear whether banks fare better after an internal
depreciation than after an external one. It is only clear
that companies of the real economy will fare better
after an external depreciation. 
In view of these uncertainties in the analysis, the
EEAG has decided not to opt for a particular policy
alternative but only to inform policymakers of the rel-
evant arguments. Definitely, there is no alternative
that clearly dominates the other in all dimensions. The
choice is between two evils. 
3.6.3 Transfer union
In 2009 Greece had a current account deficit and net
capital import of 11 percent of GDP, an excess of
consumption over aggregate income of 12 percent of
GDP and a public deficit of 15 percent of GDP.
Public debt relative to GDP is estimated to be about
140 percent at the end of 2010, and net foreign debt to
GDP about 100 percent. The country lived beyond its
means, and capital markets are no longer willing to
finance this. They have abruptly tightened the budget
constraints, which had long been overly soft. In a
painful process of internal or external depreciation
Greece will have to lower the euro-value of Greek
GDP if not real GDP, unless the missing capital flows
are replaced with public transfers from other coun-
tries. Basically this means that import goods that
Greece can no longer buy on credit would have to be
given to the country.
It is true that the EU cohesion funds as well as agri-
cultural and other subsidies already contribute to
financing the Greek trade deficit. In 2009 Greece paid
in 2.4 billion euros and received 5.4 billion, which
implied a net gain of about 1.3 percent of Greek GDP
in 2009. Much more than this would be needed, how-
ever, to make a substantial contribution towards mit-
igating the problem. 
Whether the EU budget should be expanded for this
purpose is a distributional question that will have to
be decided by the political process. Politicians should
not overlook, however, that there is the risk of Greece
becoming addicted to the transfers, since it seems to
have become addicted to the capital flows of the past.
Simply replacing the borrowed funds with gifts will
make it even more attractive for Greece to continue
living beyond its means and will therefore perpetuate
the trade deficit for the simple reason that political
constraints will never be as tight as market con-
straints. 
How difficult if not futile it is to accommodate a
region’s lack of competitiveness with transfers is
shown by former East Germany that joined West
Germany and the European Union some twenty years
ago. Up to 2011 about 1.2 trillion euros of public
funds have been pumped into the east German econ-
omy without the eastern part of Berlin, and including
it possibly about 1.5 trillion euros.32 While the lion’s
share of this money has been used to maintain the
social system, a perfect public infrastructure has also
been built up and all cities have been superbly
restored. 
Nevertheless, the economy of eastern Germany does
not function well. Its growth has been meagre, and
even in the last boom, just before the crisis in 2008, its
unemployment had not come down to less than
12 percent. The hopelessness of the situation has lead
to an ongoing mass emigration. Since the wall came
down, the population has shrunk by 2.3 million, from
an original 16 million, mostly by emigration to west-
ern Germany – 60 percent of this emigration has
occurred since 1995. 
The mass emigration is the only reason why, over the
last 15 years, (1995–2010) GDP per capita on the terri-
tory of the former German Democratic Republic
(GDR) increased from 60 to 69 percent of the west
German level (including the west part of Berlin). With
a cumulative rise of 22 percent over the period from
1995 to 2010, GDP in eastern Germany grew nearly
exactly as fast as GDP in western Germany (20 per-
cent). And surprisingly, eastern Germany did not par-
ticipate in the rapid growth process of the GIPS coun-
tries, whose GDP grew by 52 percent. Neither was it
able to match the average growth of the EU countries,
which was 31 percent over the fifteen-year period con-
sidered. In per capita terms, the purchasing power of
the privately produced GDP in eastern Germany has
been surpassed already by that of Slovenia, even
though Slovenia joined the European Union 14 years
later and had no comparable support from the outside. 
Even 20 years after unification, there are no indica-
tions that eastern Germany’s economic power will, in
the foreseeable future, converge to that of western
Germany and that the public transfers from west to
32 See Blum et al. (2009). east, which are about 60 billion euros per year, will
become superfluous. 
This disappointing development can be attributed
to the above-mentioned Dutch disease. Just as the
natural-resource sector in the Netherlands had
weakened industry by raising the Dutch wage level,
the high wages paid in eastern Germany’s govern-
ment sector and the wage replacement incomes
offered by the social system had driven up eastern
German wages above the level compatible with a
self-sustained growth process. The persistent flow
of public funds has in the end helped eastern
Germany only a little, if at all. It has made it an-
other European Mezzogiorno – a region stuck in a 
low-development equilibrium.
The Italian Mezzogiorno has been caught in such
an equilibrium for half a century and more. Its
GDP per capita is about 60 percent of that of the
rest of Italy and does not show any sign of conver-
gence. In Italy, the causes for this situation can be
sought in a common wage policy, mainly dictated
by the conditions of the North, which has always
resulted in wages that were way too high for the
South and resulted in persistent mass unemploy-
ment. The under-development has forced the state
to help out with transfers from the North. These
transfers have provided an alternative income
source in the South to which the political system
and the economy have grown accustomed, perpetu-
ating the situation, as it seems, even more (see Sinn
and Westermann 2006). 
For these reasons, the EEAG is sceptical about replac-
ing the capital flows with transfers that involve more
international redistribution in the European Union or
the euro area. Instead it argues for helping out Greece
under the general rules specified in Chapter 2. 
3.6.4 Necessary tax reforms in Greece
Whichever of the above options are chosen for
Greece, the country itself must carry out substan-
tial reforms to improve its competitiveness as
quickly as possible. Reforms of the tax system are
the most urgent of all, because they would not only
help the Greek government reduce its budget deficit
but could also improve the competitiveness of the
Greek economy, thus mitigating the adjustment
problems that accompany with internal or external
depreciations. 
A notable feature of the Greek economy is that its
supply-side structure is tilted towards producing non-
traded goods. Adopting the concept of “tradedness”
as a proxy for tradability (Kravis and Lipsey 1988),
one can construct either “narrow” or “broad” mea-
sures of the size of the tradable sector. Engler et al.
(2009) find that Greece has one of the lowest shares of
traded sector output among the OECD countries
when the narrow definition is adopted, and the lowest
share of traded sector output if the broader definition
is adopted. 
We believe that an important explanation for the
small traded sector is related to the features of the
Greek tax system, and especially the differential
incidence of tax evasion between the traded and
non-traded sectors. We are convinced that tax eva-
sion, among other things, affects the specialisation
of the economy between traded and non-traded sec-
tors and that this negatively influences the aggregate
productivity level. The reason for this is that tax
evasion is more prevalent in non-traded goods
(medical and law services, car repairs, etc.) than in
traded goods. It is well known (see e.g. de Paula and
Scheinkman 2009) that exporting firms usually
transact with other formal-sector firms, like finan-
cial intermediaries, and also need the appropriate
documentation to export. This certainly limits the
possibilities to evade taxation.
The implication of the above is that the effective,
after-tax relative price of the traded sector is smaller
than can be surmised by simply looking at the market
prices of the two sectors. As a result, the traded sector
attracts fewer resources than it would attract in the
absence of tax evasion. Fighting tax evasion results in
a rise in the effective relative price of the traded sector
and reduces the attractiveness of non-traded sector
activities. Thus, measures to reduce tax evasion may
help restore the external balance in the same way as a
change in the real exchange rate but without many of
the negative side effects. In addition, since formal-sec-
tor firms are more productive than informal sector
firms, a reduction in tax evasion would raise the econ-
omy’s overall productivity and also lead to higher
government revenues.33 Thus, fighting tax evasion
could be the “mother” of structural reforms for
Greece.
However, combating tax evasion is easier said than
done in Greece. Nevertheless, if the objective is to
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boost the size of the tradable sector, a rise in VAT
rates would go some way towards rebalancing relative
prices. The suggestion by Blanchard (2007), with ref-
erence to Portugal, to increase VAT rates and reduce
social security contributions (payroll tax rates) would
be particularly beneficial for Greece given, 
• the proclivity of the non-traded sector to evade on
the payment of payroll taxes by more than the
traded sector,
• that it is difficult to totally evade the payment of
VAT given the system of tax credits for the pur-
chase of intermediate inputs, and 
• that exporters are not burdened by the rise in VAT.
In effect, the rise in VAT rates combined with the
reduction in payroll tax rates mimics the effects of
devaluation (but without its costs) since it succeeds
in increasing the relative price of imports relative to
domestic production and in decreasing the relative
price of exports. Clearly, the tax shift has to be sub-
stantial in order to have effects as strong as a de-
valuation. 
The usual argument against such a policy is that it
may not be politically viable. Unlike the working
population, who will not necessarily be hurt by the
mix of lower payroll tax rates and higher VAT rates,
pensioners will suffer. However, the government
can devise supplementary schemes that directly
compensate the pensioners for the loss of real pur-
chasing power, and that do not, in tandem with the
change in the tax mix, deteriorate the budget bal-
ance. This policy is certainly preferable to the stan-
dard IMF prescription that the substantial wage
reductions in the public sector should be followed
by equally substantial reductions in private-sector
wages. As Corsetti (2010) has argued, internal
depreciation has effects on the debt burden similar
to the ones identified with respect to exchange rate
devaluation in the “original sin” literature (see
Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999). The usual IMF
prescription of coordinated wage reductions in
both the public and private sectors may provide the
government with some savings on its wage bill,34
but when the stock of public debt is large these sav-
ings will be dwarfed by the larger real value of the
public debt and the associated rise in the real value
of debt servicing. 
3.6.5 Greece does not graduate in time – 
another bailout package in 2013?
We have argued that even if Greek society accepts the
policies detailed in the Memorandum, it is by no
means certain that by the second quarter of 2013 the
Greek government will be able to roll over its debt at
default-avoiding interest rates. What will happen in
this case? 
Let us examine the case that by spring 2013 both the
public debt-to-GDP ratio and the foreign debt-to-
GDP ratio appear to have stabilized at levels similar
or only slightly higher than those predicted by the
European Union and the IMF, and that there is a pri-
mary budget surplus. If foreign lenders remain unwill-
ing to lend to Greece at default-preventing interest
rates (say, because they consider that the smallest
shock could derail the planned reduction of the debt
ratio), the Greek government, the IMF and the EU
countries may or may not be willing to agree on a fur-
ther bailout programme. 
It is important in this context to note that no majori-
ty decisions of the European Union will be sufficient
for a continuation of the bailout programme. After
all, the agreement of the EU countries on 16–17 De-
cember 2010 (see Chapter 2 for details) explicitly rules
out the use of Community instruments with majority-
based decision-making for this purpose, and the inter-
governmental help as specified in the decisions of
May 2010 were illegal, as French Finance Minister
Christine Lagarde has declared, implicitly confirming
a rumour that the German Constitutional Court
required a treaty change because the decisions were
illegal.35 All will depend on how the envisaged reform
of the Community treaty will be designed.
In Chapter 2 we have given our proposals for specify-
ing the decisions of 16–17 December. In principle we
foresee a three-step procedure, with liquidity help in
the first stage, a breakwater procedure that avoids full
insolvency in the second stage and full insolvency. 
There is a good chance that Greece will be able to find
new funds in the capital market if it is able to offer the
new CAC bonds, which offer the privilege of being
convertible, after a haircut, into partially secured
replacement bonds should Greece not be able to ser-
34 The reduction in the government’s wage bill depends, among other
things, on the share of government and private sector employees in
total employment, since the saving on the wages of public employees,
net of taxes, must be counted against the lower tax receipts from pri-
vate sector employees.
35 Lagarde said: “We violated all the rules because we wanted to close
ranks and really rescue the euro zone”, Reuters, “France’s Lagarde:
EU rescues “violated” rules: report”, www.reuters.com/article/idUST
RE6BH0V020101218, 18 December 2010.vice them. As this limits the possible loss to investors,
it will be possible to sell these bonds in the market if
they are endowed with an appropriate and limited
interest rate spread over safer assets. 
Should Greece nevertheless not be able or willing to
issue such bonds, it might have the chance of receiv-
ing more liquidity help from the new European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) for a limited time span
under the rules we have specified.
If not, it will have to reach an agreement with its cred-
itors about restructuring its debt, perhaps using par-
tially secured replacement bonds under the rules we
have outlined. The ESM agreed on 16–17 December
2010 could help, as we have pointed out, but only
after private creditors have agreed to a haircut. 
Politically, the question of whether or not Greece will
or should exit from the euro area will depend on
which of these choices are made, but from an eco-
nomic perspective it is a separate issue, as we have
argued above. Greece should make this decision based
on its judgement of whether or not an internal or
external depreciation will bring about less hardship. 
3.7 Concluding remarks
We end this chapter with some summary conclusions.
• Without help Greece is not likely to be able to
return to market financing at default-avoiding
interest rates by the time the current bailout pack-
age expires (2013). The chances of this happening
have certainly been reduced as a result of the large
upward revisions of its budget deficit and debt for
2009, and the consequent upward drift of the cor-
responding figures for 2010.
• With the new CAC bonds that we have proposed in
Chapter 2, Greece would however have access to a
new debt instrument that limits the investment risk
and with it the necessary interest surcharges over
risk-free assets. These bonds would significantly
enhance the possibility of a self-sustained recovery. 
• If Greece nevertheless is not able or willing to issue
the new debt instruments, it will have to seek an
agreement with its creditors about a debt resched-
uling programme. The European Stability
Mechanism could help by offering a limited
amount of secured replacement bonds, as specified
in Chapter 2.
• To reduce its huge current account deficit, Greece
will have to undergo a period of internal or exter-
nal depreciation, which will lower the euro-value of
Greek wages, prices and GDP. We have pointed out
the advantages and disadvantages of the two pos-
sibilities. 
• Although one cannot deny the importance of the
planned product market reforms, fighting tax eva-
sion should be the top priority of Greek policy-
makers. Tax evasion is responsible not only for the
Greek budget deficits, but it results in a misalloca-
tion of resources away from production of traded
goods that the country must reverse if it is to
improve its trade balance. 
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